It is not only during wartime that the media tells one story, while the unvarnished historical and diplomatic record suggests another. But wartime conditions create a noticeable ratcheting up of public relations exercises.

Often, the techniques are sufficiently crude that the fanaticism and duplicity of “our guys” becomes more noticeable. For example, on Week 2 of the crisis in Lebanon (and after eleven days of Israeli air strikes) US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice finally cleared her schedule and announced a July 23 departure date for the Middle East. Instead of asking why the delay, the media presented her impending visit with considerable fanfare as a “diplomatic offensive.”

On July 24th Rice met with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and even made a surprise visit to Lebanon, where she met with Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. She also viewed some of the massive damage sustained by Beirut and its southern border.

While such photo ops impressed commentators with Rice’s concern for the plight of Lebanese civilians, Washington’s initial foot-dragging was initially interpreted by Israel as a green light for continued violence. Washington’s staunch refusal to call for an immediate Israeli withdrawal merely confirmed this interpretation.

Here, the myth of a highly moral and “well-intentioned” White House is widespread, with the documentary record contorted to reinforce comforting myths and self-serving beliefs. So when the Israeli bombing campaign against Lebanon began on July 12th, Rice dismissed the prompt call by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan for an immediate halt to the bombing as premature and counter-productive. That Washington and Tel Aviv might regard an immediate bombing halt as counter-productive to their respective strategic and tactical goals is a common view in the Arab world, yet this view remains virtually incomprehensible to the mainstream media in the West.

The climax of Rice’s trip took place on July 26 in Rome, as journalists waited in vain for an end to diplomatic gridlock. Yet the peace mission failed, having reached an impasse on the crucial issue: the call by Kofi Annan (and the global majority) that Israel agree to an unconditional and immediate bombing halt. The reason for the failure could hardly be kept secret: the Bush-Rice diplomatic team decided that bombing can be useful and would have to continue. And if the result is a lengthy negotiation process while the  cannonballs fly, then Hezbollah and its Syrian and Iranian backers have only themselves to blame.

Obviously, Condoleeza Rice, ever the loyal insider, had been sent by President Bush merely to squelch any talk of unconditional cessation of hostilities: instead, the US was giving unconditional support to Israel. In Rome, Rice did not change her stance or even bother to change her rhetoric.

The oft-repeated line from the beginning of the crisis she repeated again: “We cannot return to the status quo ante.” Of course, the exact contours of the status quo ante post bellum can be determined only after a successful bombing campaign. For neocon hardliners, the only conceivable solution is a military one. As noted, myth construction is a growth industry in US political culture, typified by such headlines as “Rice Emphasizes Need for Lasting Peace in Lebanon” (New York Times, July 28, 2006). Given the context, such headlines are positively Orwellian: War is Peace.

“It is time for a new Middle East,” Rice informed the press — but not new and improved. The actual Lebanese casualty figures are probably double the official figures, which is standard practice when the aggressor is an ally.

(A media addict would respond by asking “And what of the aggression of Hezbollah terrorists?” My subject is the war in Lebanon: the war, not a cross-border skirmish against a military target that Israel used as a pretext for starting a war.) Whatever the actual casualty figures, all this carnage was termed “an appropriate response” by Richard Perle, whose July 22nd op-ed in the New York Times provides great insight into the policy preferences of neoconservative hardliners. Perle advocates “precise military action against Hezbollah and its infrastructure in Lebanon and Syria, for as long as it takes without regard to mindless diplomatic blather about proportionality.”

Perle goes on to recommend that “Israel see the current fighting through to a conclusion [and] now deal a blow of such magnitude to those who would destroy it as to leave no doubt that its earlier policy of acquiescence is over…”¹ The tactic of historical revisionism by far rightists aside (Israeli “acquiescence” indeed!), it is apparent that President Bush agrees, as his administration recently increased military aid to Israel, including F-15 jet fighters, $300 million worth of aviation fuel, and even precision-guided bombs, which are especially useful these days.

Yet, “blessed are the peacemakers,” say the media. Under very different circumstances in 1999, Kofi Annan made a speech which acknowledged that divisions in the UN Security Council sometimes led to a failure to enforce its decisions. Annan pointed out that “if states bent on criminal behavior know that the Security Council will take action to halt crimes against humanity, they will not embark on such a course of action in expectation of sovereign impunity.” Of course, the concept of a “state bent on criminal behavior” cannot apply to the US or Israel, whatever the facts. While Annan had Yugoslavia (and undoubtedly Rwanda) in mind, it is useful to apply his comments to the present crisis in Lebanon. Annan’s speech lamented the inability of the UN Security Council to find a strategy for Kosovo, contrasting this with the expeditious vote to approve an Australian-led force for East Timor — to protect civilians from the unrestrained predations of a superior military force. In Kosovo, crimes were also committed by both sides: but only in 1999 was the case made for what was righteously termed a “humanitarian intervention.”

In a 1996 collection of essays on peacekeeping entitled Preventive Diplomacy, Annan’s contribution candidly spoke of the necessity for a “genuine desire for peace amongst the warring parties. No system can achieve peace when leaders use negotiation not to end conflict but merely to prolong it to advantage.”² Yet Condoleeza Rice is presented by the media not as a representative of one of the most reactionary governments in US history, but as a well-intentioned diplomat — although one whose power places her above the rest.

Between formal sessions in Rome, TV cameras showed the would-be peacemakers Rice and Annan engaged in cooperative consultation, with the audio off.

Despite such imagery, which depicts Condi and Kofi as like-minded diplomats — albeit a pair who might differ on a few minor operational details in their mutual quest for peace — the US relationship with the UN is clearly becoming strained, as the isolation of Bush has led to mounting international pressure to halt the bombing. Future visits by Ms. Rice to the Middle East will be determined based on the evaluation of her success in burnishing the Bush image. Clearly, it was determined that she must work harder at the diplomatic task of surmounting the impression (with a little help from Tony Blair) that the Bush administration is out of step with world opinion vis-à-vis Lebanon.

But as we stay tuned for more public relations efforts disguised as diplomacy, we should try to recall Week 2 of the crisis, when the US media swallowed Rice’s rationalizations for further violence without considering the possibility that the people of Lebanon were targeted for collective punishment to alienate them from Hezbollah, whose growing political (not only military) power would not be tolerated by Israel. Instead, the Lebanese people were depicted as caught in the crossfire, i.e., collateral damage.

Washington’s balancing act is to adhere to a policy of realpolitik while cultivating an image in the West as the always “well-intentioned” leader of the “civilized world.” This image is merely reinforced by the tepid criticisms of US liberals who accuse Washington of — almost irrationally — dithering on diplomacy, not of cold-bloodedly hindering sincere peacekeeping efforts for reasons of state. As of this writing, the weak Lebanese government continues in vain to call for international intervention, and the much-admired Condi Rice can only respond by trying to score political points, with name-calling against Hezbollah and its Syrian and Iranian supporters, while the slaughter of innocents continues.

1 Richard Perle. “An Appropriate Response,” op-ed, New York Times, July 22, 2006.

2 Kevin Cahill, Dr. (ed.) Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars Before They Start. New York Basic Books, 1996, p. 181.